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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

21 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~LIEUTENANT~~ GENERAL TRUSCOTT

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, dated 14 May 1957, together with its enclosure entitled, "Criteria for Use in Discussions with CIA."

It is suggested that we discuss this matter at an early date. In the meantime, I shall await notification from you.

[Signature]
G. B. ERSKINE
General, USMC (Ret)
Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

Enclosure-
as stated

THE CIA HAS NO OBJECTION
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
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AUTHORITY: 105-308

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DATE 13/2/81

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OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

14 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Establishment and Control of Unconventional Assets and Operations in Support of Overt Military Operations (S).

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), dated 22 January 1957, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree in the concern expressed therein over CIA's inability to meet all of the unconventional warfare (UW) requirements submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and further agree that it would be desirable to reach an understanding with CIA under which the Military Services, in peacetime, would develop assets which will be required for unconventional military operations in wartime. In order to more properly orient the CIA effort, proportionate responsibility should be delineated and assigned to the Department of Defense, within its capabilities and in coordination with CIA, for developing covert assets in support of U.S. military plans and objectives in non-denied areas.

3. CIA, as a matter of priority, should devote a greater proportion of its effort to the covert development of UW assets in denied areas in support of UW plans. In the event that assets adequate to support U.S. military requirements cannot be developed by this action, CIA should so inform the Department of Defense, and request such assistance as may be appropriate, to develop in peacetime, covert UW assets in denied areas. The attached criteria do not reflect this proposal pertaining to denied areas. However, this should be a subject for discussion.

4. The attached criteria are for use in discussions with CIA. It is understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be afforded an opportunity to submit formal comments and recommendations after the discussions have taken place.

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5. In establishing finally agreed Defense-CIA responsibilities, it is considered appropriate to point out that commensurate budgetary and personnel provisions must be made within the Department of Defense.

6. It is also recommended that special precautions be taken to insure that coordination with other U.S. country programs is accomplished by Defense and CIA in carrying out finally agreed responsibilities.


7. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. TWining,
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

Enclosure
Appendix

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TOP SECRETA P P E N D I XCRITERIA FOR USE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH CIA

1. General.

a. There exists a requirement for a clear delineation of Defense-CIA responsibilities regarding the establishment and control of UW assets and operations in non-denied areas in peacetime.

b. Primary responsibility for the establishment and control of UW assets, in preparation for support of military operations, as a general but not exclusive rule, should be that of Defense if overt, and of CIA if covert.

c. A generally agreed understanding of what is meant by "unconventional warfare operations in peacetime" is desirable. It is not possible to delineate responsibilities until an agreement is reached as to the meaning of this term. At present there is no agreed definition, and the term is used with varying interpretations. While it is understood that primary responsibility for "covert operations" is that of CIA, to be coordinated and conducted as provided for in NSC 5412/2, the term "covert operations" is not synonymous with "unconventional warfare operations in peacetime."

2. For discussion purposes, at least, it appears that there are areas where agreed definitions would assist common understanding. Submitted for your consideration are the following definitions as used herein:

a. UW Assets: Civilian personnel (individuals, groups of individuals, or organization) normally indigenous, in place or which can be placed in position to accomplish or support UW wartime operations, usually established through covert methods.

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b. UW Forces: Military personnel, supplied with the proper equipment (communications, transportation, and logistical support) and trained to conduct UW wartime operations, usually established through overt methods.

3. Establishment of UW requirements.

Requirements for the establishment of UW assets in peacetime to be used during hostilities will be developed by and included in the UW plans of commanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The appropriate area CIA Senior War Planner will indicate acceptance or rejection of requirements placed on CIA, subject to final CIA Headquarters approval. Final approval or rejection of these requirements will be indicated by CIA after receipt of these UW plans as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Any disagreement will be resolved between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. [Requirements for UW forces, U. S. and indigenous, will be the responsibility of the military.]

4. Division of responsibilities for the establishment and control of UW assets and forces in non-denied areas in peacetime.

a. Defense:

- (1) Establishment and control of UW forces ✓
- (2) Working relationships with the military establishment of the host country. ✓
- (3) Coordination of the establishment and control of UW assets with CIA through the U. S. military command to which the area is assigned for UW coordination. ✓
- (4) Furnishing required support and materials peculiar to Defense.

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TOP SECRETb. CIA:

(1) Establishment and control of UW assets in support of approved U. S. military requirements, except as provided for in paragraph c, below.

(2) Working relationships with the ~~(civilian)~~ clandestine service of the host country.

(3) Furnishing required support and materials peculiar to CIA.

c. In the event that CIA is unable to fulfill approved U. S. UW requirements, CIA should inform the Department of Defense. Within capabilities and in coordination with CIA Defense may then be assigned the responsibility for the development and control of required covert assets and the working relationships with the civilian clandestine service of the host country.

5. Logistics arrangements will be as provided for in the UW Annex to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the Defense-CIA logistical responsibilities agreement.

6. It is recognized that special circumstances or conditions may arise, or disagreement develop as to the division of responsibilities. Such cases will be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Director of Central Intelligence, as appropriate, for resolution.

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Appendix

